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this specific situation. More importantly, the authors also distinguish between two crucially different readings of my claim (H) that '[i] f some E speaks in favour of some H-say, because it is a logical consequence of the latter-then [. . .] getting to know that E is probably true should provide confirmation for H-and the more probable it is that E is true, the more it should do so' (Huber [2005] , p. 105, italics added). Therefore their paper helps to clarify an ambiguity in mine, and it provides an important contribution to Bayesian confirmation theory.
However, the target of my ([2005] ) is not some specific issue-viz. confirmation by uncertain evidence-within Bayesian confirmation theory, but rather that theory itself. Crupi et al. ([2008] ) reject-correctly, I think-one reading, called (H.2), of my claim (H). They develop a general Bayesian account of confirmation by uncertain evidence based on a second reading, called (H.1). I argue that Bayesian confirmation theory gets things wrong if it adopts the reading (H.2) rejected by the authors, and that it is subject to a triviality charge if it adopts the reading (H.1) accepted by the authors.
More specifically, I use a feature of (H.1) to prove the following result: for any subjective probability measure Pr i at time t i , for any hypothesis H, and any atomic evidence E that is relevant to H (in the sense of Pr i ), there are assignments of probabilities Pr 0 , Pr 0 * and Pr 0 * * such that E confirms H at time To illustrate, consider a community of scientists that has come to agree on the subjective probabilities to be assigned to the hypotheses of their interest. That is the situation of 'objectivity as inter-subjective agreement for opinions that fall short of certainty' (Earman [1992] , p. 138). If these scientists also agree on the (cognitive) utilities they assign to these hypotheses, and if the decision rule they use is determined by their probabilities and utilities (as is the case if they maximize expected utility), they accept, reject and laugh at the very same hypotheses-even though they disagree as to whether the data that have driven their agreement are to be called 'incrementally confirming' or 'incrementally disconfirming' or neither (let alone to what degree).
I am happy to concede that positive probabilistic relevance is the correct explication of the explicandum 'confirmation'. If there were one and only one, I would even be happy to concede that the normalized distance measure (or, for that matter, the odds or log-likelihood ratio measure) is the correct explication of the explicandum 'degree of confirmation'. What I do not concede is that the very concept of (degree of) confirmation explicated in this-or, in case of degrees of incremental confirmation, any other-way is of any use. In fact, I claim the contrary, for this concept sees disagreement where there is nothing but agreement (with regard to all that matters).
The history of confirmation theory is, to a large extent, a history of triviality results. Hempel ([1945] ) shows confirmation to be trivial if it satisfies certain conditions of adequacy. Goodman ([2006 Goodman ([ /1954 ) shows confirmation to be trivial if it is construed in purely syntactical terms. Bayesian confirmation theory escapes these triviality results since its notion of incremental confirmation violates Hempel's conditions, and expressions that are syntactically alike need not be alike in their probabilities.
In my ([2005] ) I argue that Bayesian confirmation theory is nevertheless subject to a triviality charge: we can incrementally confirm everything by anything atomic and relevant as long as we choose an appropriate prior. That result depends on a particular treatment of uncertain evidence that I claim the Bayesian is forced to adopt if she wants to get things right. I take the fact that the authors' general account of confirmation by uncertain evidence yields this treatment for the special scenario I focus on to show that my original triviality charge still holds.
